











Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 June 2016




Sébastien Colin, « China, the US, and the Law of the Sea », China Perspectives [Online], 2016/2 | 2016,
Online since 01 June 2016, connection on 15 September 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
chinaperspectives/6994 
© All rights reserved
The South China Sea, a major transit area of international maritimetraffic, is the scene of territorial and maritime claims expressed bythe riparian states, including China but also Vietnam, the Philippines,
Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, and now represents one of the main stumbling
blocks in the US-China bilateral relationship. Between October 2015 and
mid-May 2016, a series of initiatives taken unilaterally by China on one side
and the US on the other have greatly exacerbated the latent confrontation
of the two powers in this maritime space.
Chinese initiatives have essentially consisted of fitting out the Paracel Is-
lands and some recently reclaimed reefs of the Spratly archipelago with trans-
port infrastructure. To this end, the Chinese Ministry of Transport has installed
three lighthouses on the Spratly Islands: two on Cuarteron and South Johnson
reefs on 9 October 2015 (1) and a third on Subi Reef on 6 April 2016. (2) On 2
January 2016, the spokeswoman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Hua Chunying, confirmed completion of construction of an aerodrome on
Fiery Cross Reef, which US satellite photos already showed in 2014. (3) This
confirmation was followed on 6 January by the organisation of two civilian
flight tests – one operated by China Southern Airlines and the other by Hainan
Airlines – between the airport of Haikou, the provincial capital of Hainan, and
the new Fiery Cross airfield. (4) Both tests may indicate future exploitation of
this line on the heels of what the Chinese authorities already planned to do
in the Paracel Islands. (5) Finally, other actions such as the deployment of air-
craft missile launchers on Woody Island on February 2016 (6) and anti-ship
missiles in March (7) seem to confirm the militarisation of the Paracels while
leaving some doubt as to the establishment of a similar process in the
Spratlys, which could lead, according to some observers, to the delimitation
of an air defence identification zone in the South China Sea. (8)
These initiatives, which will probably be followed by others in the coming
weeks and months, are the undisputed testimony of an increasingly firm
will from China to increase its presence in the South China Sea in order to
more effectively monitor this space and impose itself as the dominant
power. China thus materialises a historically self-proclaimed sovereignty.
At the same time, Washington has allowed the US Navy to conduct three
“Freedom of Navigation Operations” (FONOP). Three guided missile de-
stroyers, the USS Lassen, on 27 October 2015, the USS Curtis Wilbur, on 30
January 2016, and the USS William P. Lawrence, on 10 May 2016, have re-
spectively sailed within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, Triton Island, and
Fiery Cross Reef, all claimed and occupied by China. (9)
The fact that the two countries answer each other through these actions is
obvious. The deployment of missile launchers on Woody Island is clearly a re-
sponse to the passage of the USS Curtis Wilbur near Triton Island, all the more
so given that China undertook this deployment during the US-ASEAN special
leaders’ summit in Sunnylands, California, in the course of which Barack
Obama reiterated that the US would continue to “fly, sail and operate wher-
ever international law allows.” The summit’s joint statement, without clearly
mentioning Chinese initiatives in the South China Sea, included calls for re-
specting “freedom of navigation and overflight” in the maritime areas as well
as “non-militarization and self-restraint in the conduct of activities.” (10)
In fact, a major concern in Washington is that this assertion of Chinese
presence in the South China Sea will eventually threaten “freedom of nav-
igation” and in the process, American strategic and economic interests. This
concern is partly fuelled by China’s official position regarding certain articles
and clauses of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS) relating to the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea
or in the conduct of activities by foreign military ships and aircraft in the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the coastal state. The three American
FONOPs aimed to make clear that China’s maritime claims are, from the
N o . 2 0 1 6 / 2  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 57
1. “China Completes Construction of Two Large Lighthouses in the South China Sea,” Xinhua, 9 Oc-
tober 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-10/09/c_134698039.htm (accessed on 6
April 2016).
2. Prashanth Parameswaran, “China Starts Operating New South China Sea Lighthouse on Subi Reef,”
The Diplomat, 6 April 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-starts-operating-new-south-
china-sea-lighthouse-on-subi-reef (accessed on 6 April 2016).
3. “New Airfield to Boost Public Service in South China Sea: Chinese Official,” Xinhua, 5 January
2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/05/c_134977219.htm (accessed on 6 April
2016).
4. “China Conducts Successful Test Flights at Newly-Built Airfield in South China Sea,” Xinhua, 6 Jan-
uary 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/06/c_134983993.htm (accessed on 6
April 2016).
5. Jesse Johnson, “China Plans to Begin Civilian Flights to, from Disputed South China Sea Isles,” The
Japan Times, 12 March 2016, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/12/asia-pacific/china-set-to-
begin-operat ing-c iv i l ian-f l ights-to-and-from-disputed-south-china-sea-next-
year/#.VwSXksd8OUc (accessed on 6 April 2016).
6. Richard D. Fisher Jr, “China Deploys HQ-9 Surface-to-Air Missiles to Woody Island,” IHS Jane’s
Defence Weekly, 17 February 2016, www.janes.com/article/58071/china-deploys-hq-9-surface-
to-air-missiles-to-woody-island (accessed on 6 April 2016). 
7. Ankit Panda, “South China Sea: China Has Deployed Anti-Ship Missiles on Woody Island,” The
Diplomat, 26 March 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/south-china-sea-china-has-de-
ployed-anti-ship-missiles-on-woody-island (accessed on 6 April 2016).
8. Jesse Johnson, “Beijing Missile Deployment Could Lay Groundwork for South China Sea ADIZ,” The
Japan Times, 18 February 2016, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/18/national/beijing-mis-
sile-deployment-lay-groundwork-south-china-sea-adiz/#.VwaFL32LTMx (accessed on 8 April
2016).
9. Gordon Lubold and Jeremy Page, “U.S. Navy Ship Sails Near Islands Claimed by China,” The Wall
Street Journal, 26 October 2015, www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-navy-ship-sails-near-islands-claimed-
by-china-1445908192 (accessed on 8 April 2016); Reuters (Washington), “US Warship Sails near
Island Claimed by China in South China Sea,” The Guardian, 30 January 2016,
www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/30/south-china-sea-us-warship-triton-paracel-island (ac-
cessed on 6 April 2016); Euan Graham, “US Navy Carries Out Third FONOP in South China Sea,”
The Interpreter, 10 May 2016, www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/05/10/US-Navy-carries-out-
third-FONOP-in-South-China-Sea.aspx (accessed on 16 May 2016). 
10. Jeff Mason and Bruce Wallace, “Obama, ASEAN Discuss South China Sea Tensions, But No Joint
Mention of China,” Reuters, 17 February 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-asean-
idUSKCN0VP1F7 (accessed on 5 April 2016). For the text of the joint statement, see: The White
House, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-ASEAN Special Leaders’ Summit: Sunnylands Declaration,
Sunnylands, California, February 15-16, 2016,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2016/02/16/joint-statement-us-asean-special-leaders-summit-sunnylands-declaration
(accessed on 7 April 2016).
China p e r s p e c t i v e sCurrent affairs
China, the US, and the Law 
of the Sea
SÉBASTIEN COLIN
perspective of the United States, “excessive” and “inconsistent” with UNC-
LOS. In response, some Chinese legal experts consider the unconditional at-
tachment of the United States to “total” freedom of navigation to be
primarily a tool for maintaining their “maritime hegemony.” (11)
Thus, the Sino-US confrontation is also legal. What are the respective po-
sitions of China and the United States regarding UNCLOS, and what are the
details of the main points of disagreement between the two countries? We
will try here to provide answers to these questions on the basis of a corpus
of texts mainly composed of legal books and articles on Chinese and Amer-
ican positions regarding the law of the sea, official statements, as well as
the text of UNCLOS itself.
China and the United States: What official
positions regarding UNCLOS?
The Chinese and US positions regarding UNCLOS appear paradoxical at
first sight, with China having ratified the Convention while expressing several
reservations on some articles and clauses, and the United States seeing
itself as a defender of the correct implementation of the text but having
not ratified it. It seems necessary to first clarify the context of the writing
of UNCLOS, the imperfections of which fuel many divergent interpretations
and enable contradictory implementation measures.
The writing of the UNCLOS: Oppositions,
compromises and lacunae
As a real “Constitution for the oceans,” (12) UNCLOS was concluded and
opened to states’ signatures on 10 December 1982 in Montego Bay, Ja-
maica, before coming into force on 16 November 1994. (13) The adoption of
the text, comprised of 17 parts and 320 articles and punctuated by nine
annexes, marked the end of a very long negotiation that began in 1973. This
text replaced several conventions that were signed in Geneva in 1958, and
which developing countries considered too favourable to great maritime
powers and industrialised countries. (14) Aiming to legally define the maritime
areas, as well as the rights and duties of states in these spaces in terms of
navigation, exploitation of resources, and protection of the marine environ-
ment, the drafting of UNCLOS covered many geopolitical issues and was
therefore at the heart of many disagreements between states and groups
of states. The negotiation sessions were mainly the scene of fierce opposi-
tion between developing countries, anxious to extend their sovereignty and
gain exclusive rights to the exploitation of resources in the largest maritime
areas, and industrialised countries, defenders of a greater freedom of ex-
ploitation and navigation. These two visions were headed respectively by
China and the United States.
In this context, the writing of the Convention required many compro-
mises, as a result of which many items appear superficial, ambiguous,
or incomplete. (15) Part V, devoted to the EEZ, is undoubtedly one of the
best examples of this phenomenon. (16) In its 1982 version, Part XI on
the “international seabed zone” raised strong opposition from industri-
alised countries to the point that many of them refused to sign the text,
including the US. (17) It was not until 28 July 1994, following a renegoti-
ation of Part XI launched in 1990, that the UN General Assembly finally
adopted the agreement on its implementation. (18)
Some “lacunae” in the Convention are important because they leave the
field open to sometimes very divergent interpretations by states, especially
when they seek to satisfy their national interests first and foremost. As a
result of power rivalries, these “lacunae” continue to fuel deadlocks, as the
Sino-American confrontation shows.
China and UNCLOS: Ratification despite reservations
and exceptions
China signed UNCLOS when it opened for signature on 10 December
1982 and ratified it on 15 May 1996. (19)
Before its admission to the UN in October 1971, China had a very un-
favourable view of the four Geneva Conventions adopted in 1958. For the
leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, these agreements were the result
of manipulation by the great powers and served their interests over those
of the newly independent Third World. Chinese leaders especially criticised
the notion of freedom of the high sea, which in their eyes benefited only
major Western maritime powers; the criteria for exploitation of the conti-
nental shelf, regarded as favouring the more technologically advanced coun-
tries; and the right of innocent passage of foreign ships through the
territorial sea, which implicitly included military vessels. In this context,
China sided with other developing countries in calling for the writing of a
new Convention. (20)
During negotiations, when the width of the territorial sea was debated,
China opposed from the outset the width of three nautical miles defended
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by the American and British naval powers, and defended the idea, with a
large majority of states (89 of 116), of a width of 12 nautical miles or more.
Like most developing countries, China demanded the establishment of an
EEZ with a width of 200 nautical miles after a failed attempt, alongside
Peru, to territorialise this maritime jurisdiction by claiming the coastal
state’s full authority over it. (21) China refused, however, the principle of the
median line and equidistance for the delimitation of potential tangles of
EEZ between two opposite or adjacent States. Finally, China reiterated con-
cerns regarding the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea,
which it wanted to give only to civilian ships, and campaigned for the recog-
nition of exclusive control by the coastal state of marine scientific research
inside the EEZ.
In sum, after several years of rivalries and arbitration, China was not
fully satisfied with the text concluded in 1982, and at the time of the
adoption of the Convention, Han Xu, President of the Chinese delegation,
criticised the presence of “shortcomings and even serious defects in the
provisions of quite a few articles.” (22) The reasons why China immediately
signed the Convention on 10 December 1982 were in fact essentially po-
litical. In the eyes of Chinese leaders, this new version of UNCLOS, re-
placing an “old law of the sea which only served the interests of a few
big powers,” was especially “conducive to the fight against maritime
hegemonism.” (23) As for the rest, the Chinese authorities maintained their
position and continued to oppose certain provisions of the Convention
through the enactment of a national maritime legislation, including the
“Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February
1992” and the “Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act of
26 June 1998.” (24)
The United States and UNCLOS: The permanent
question of ratification
The fact that the first global maritime power still has not, as of April 2016,
ratified the UNCLOS while it intends to defend the principles of this inter-
national law on the world stage is at first glance surprising. This is even more
the case as the United States brought all its influence to bear on the nego-
tiations in obtaining many compromises, (25) and as the main obstacle to its
accession, i.e. Part XI on the international seabed zone, was removed with
the adoption of the new agreement on 28 July 1994 that it signed quickly.
At first sight, this signature logically opened the way for quick ratification.
But more than 20 years later, although supported by the respective admin-
istration of Clinton, Bush II and Obama, the text of the Convention still has
not been voted on by the Senate because it hasn’t gotten the necessary
2/3 vote for ratification or because its assessment has been put aside in
favour of issues considered more urgent. (26)
The Senate’s refusal to ratify the UNCLOS is the result of strong opposi-
tion from a handful of senators belonging to the most conservative wing
of the Republican Party. Their main argument is that the Convention is “in-
consistent with American sovereignty and values” and that the US, in the
case of ratification, has more to lose than to gain politically and economi-
cally. (27) In other words, they believe that their country will not receive any
benefit from accession and that it remains quite capable of protecting its
maritime interests outside the Convention. (28) Finally, the fact that a number
of states, including China, have ratified the text without giving up claims
that the United States deemed “excessive” has created doubt over the real
value of accepting it.
The contingent supporting ratification is much broader and includes
members of both the Democratic and Republican parties, former officers
of the US Navy and US Coast Guard, industrial interests (including oil and
mining companies), and marine environmental protection associations. (29)
According to this side, UNCLOS does not run counter to US national in-
terests. (30) For some political and military players, two factors even make
its ratification very urgent: firstly the Arctic, where in the context of the
ice melt the United States risks being marginalised in the face of Canadian
and Russian claims, and secondly China’s recent assertiveness in the South
China Sea and in maritime affairs globally, coupled with the rapid mod-
ernisation of its navy, which are seen as major challenges in terms of se-
curity. (31) Other arguments state that ratification would also help
rehabilitate the image of the US, often accused by other states of “despis-
ing” international law, a feeling that tends to encourage rather than dis-
courage the “excessive” maritime claims that the United States is trying
to fight in East Asia and around the world. (32) According to the Convention’s
supporters, this would facilitate new states joining in maritime security
operations such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which China
and some other countries such as Indonesia do not consider legal because
it is conducted under the command of a state that is not a party to the
Convention. (33)
Pending a possible though very hypothetical future ratification, the United
States continues to work outside the Convention, a number of the clauses
of which it nevertheless implements. It thus established an EEZ of 200 nau-
tical miles in 1983, extended its territorial sea from an initial width of three
nautical miles to one of 12 nautical miles in 1988, and added to it a con-
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tiguous zone in 1999. (34) Open to two vast oceans, the United States has
the largest EEZ in the world and one of the largest continental shelves. Be-
yond the initial reluctance that prevented its signature, UNCLOS in fact al-
lows American power to profit from this advantageous geography.
However, the main US concern in terms of international law of the sea re-
gards “excessive” maritime claims that would hamper its right of freedom of
navigation and overflight. To counter this, the US authorities in 1979 intro-
duced the “freedom of navigation program,” (35) which aims to challenge state
practices that in their view are inconsistent with the international law of the
sea. Although, as the US Department of Defense reports show, (36) China is not
the only state targeted by the “freedom of navigation operations,” the asser-
tion of Chinese presence in the South China Sea and the strategic rivalry of
the two powers draws attention and media coverage to operations that, if
conducted in other maritime areas of the world, would no doubt pass unno-
ticed.
Sino-US disputes regarding the law of the
sea
Given that the three recent freedom of navigation operations conducted
by the US Navy in the South China Sea had the main objective of challeng-
ing China’s “excessive” maritime claims, (37) what are China’s claims, and
what are the main points of disagreement between the two countries?
The passage of the USS Lassen within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, a low-
tide elevation that China reclaimed and developed during the years 2014
and 2015, aimed to refute the possible delimitation by China of a territorial
sea around it and thus demand total freedom of navigation. As a natural
structure above water at low tide but submerged at high tide, the low-tide
elevation is not an island, and thus, in the eyes of UNCLOS and despite recla-
mation work, cannot have a territorial sea of its own. (38) An exception exists,
however, where low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly within the
territorial sea of  a state or an island. Article 13 mentions in fact that it may
be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, thus
increasing its size. (39) Now, it happens that Subi Reef is located within 12
miles of Sandy Cay, which could have a territorial sea of its own but which
is administered by the Philippines. China, which claims all the islands located
in the South China Sea under its sovereignty, nevertheless could consider
that it has the right to delineate a territorial sea from Subi Reef.
For its part, the passage of the USS Curtis Wilbur within the limit of 12
nautical miles from Triton Island aimed first to challenge China’s establish-
ment of archipelagic baselines, including all the Paracels, which is inconsis-
tent with UNCLOS, (40) and secondly as a reminder of the importance the
United States attaches to the right of innocent passage of warships through
the territorial sea of  other states without prior notification. This question
of the right of innocent passage, which also motivated the freedom of nav-
igation operation of 10 May 2016, is one of the main points of disagreement
between China and the United States, alongside differing interpretations
relating to military activities, especially hydrographic gathering, and marine
scientific research in the EEZ. (41)
The right of innocent passage through the territorial sea
If UNCLOS recognises the sovereignty of the coastal state over the terri-
torial sea, this sovereignty is nevertheless incomplete because states have
an obligation not to hamper the innocent passage of foreign vessels. (42) The
main point of controversy here is the lack of precision regarding the type
of vessels involved and whether or not military vessels are included. For
many lawyers, this inclusion is implicit, as Article 20 also states, “In the ter-
ritorial sea, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to nav-
igate on the surface and to show their flag.” (43)
However, although the majority of states that have ratified the Convention
recognise, explicitly or implicitly, the right of innocent passage for military
vessels through their territorial sea, a number of countries, including China,
require advance approval or prior notification. These requirements were at
the heart of intense debate during negotiations over the Conventions of 1958
and 1982 but were never accepted due to a lack of consensus and very strong
opposition from the United States, the USSR, and their respective allies.
On this issue, China has maintained the position that it took during nego-
tiations. If it recognises a right of innocent passage in its “Law on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February 1992,” it nevertheless makes a
distinction between military vessels and commercial ships, the former requir-
ing authorisation from the Chinese authorities before entering the Chinese
territorial sea. (44) This last point has been strongly criticised by the United
States, which considers the establishment of an advance authorisation or prior
notification a “hindrance” to innocent passage and therefore inconsistent with
Article 24 of the Convention defining obligations of the coastal state. (45)
Hydrographic gathering, marine scientific research,
and military activities in the EEZ
The second point of Sino-US controversy concerns hydrographic gathering
carried out by military vessels in the EEZ of another state and its difference
from marine scientific research. This controversy is partly based on the ab-
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sence of an exact definition of these two types of activity in the Convention.
For its part, the United States makes the distinction between hydrographic
gathering, (46) useful for making charts and for the safety of navigation, and
marine scientific research that specifically relates to the study of marine
environments, including, for example, oceanography and underwater ar-
chaeology. (47) From the American point of view, hydrographic gathering falls
under the ambit of freedom of navigation and is therefore not subject to
the control of the coastal state. This US position is strongly opposed by
China, which considers hydrographic gathering activities part of marine sci-
entific research, which according to Article 246 “shall be conducted with
the consent of the coastal State.” (48) China incorporated the main provisions
of Part XIII of UNCLOS on marine scientific research in its “Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone and Continental Shelf Act” as well as in its regulations on the
management of marine scientific research by foreign vessels, which entered
into force on 1 October 1996. (49) In addition, China regulated gathering ac-
tivities through the enactment in 1992 of a law on surveying and mapping,
which subjects any such activity on its territory and in its maritime juris-
diction to the approval of the State Council. (50)
For China, hydrographic gatherings conducted by military ships are not
innocent because the data collected can also be used for military purposes.
In other words, they may, in its view, represent a threat to the coastal state
and should therefore be controlled and regulated by this state. (51) In fact,
this disagreement refers to the broader question of whether or not a state
can conduct military activities in the EEZ of another state without its con-
sent. While the United States again advocates freedom of navigation as well
as “other internationally lawful uses of the Sea,” (52) China claims, together
with other states, (53) the right of control.
Since these disagreements have provoked incidents in the past, (54) the
possibility of new clashes occurring in the EEZs claimed by China cannot
be ruled out.
Conclusion
The positions of China and the United States regarding the law of the sea
form a complex topic exceeding the Manichean scheme that would see a
country respecting the law of the sea and another one not. Among the main
points bringing China and the United States into opposition, some Chinese
positions, such as on the right of innocent passage, appear quite clearly in
contradiction to the law of the sea, while others mainly consist of interpre-
tations of incomplete clauses or undefined terms.
The practice of both countries brings further complexity to the issue.
While China’s reclamation work and building of infrastructure on the dis-
puted Spratly Islands, like that undertaken before and at the same time by
the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam, goes against a certain “self-restraint,”
the strict implementation by China of its national laws in terms of right of
innocent passage through its territorial sea and of foreign military activities
in its claimed EEZ remains to be assessed. In the case of the three freedom
of navigation operations that the United States conducted in October 2015,
January 2016, and May 2016, the Chinese authorities protested, first ver-
bally, and then by sending fighter jets and warships, but did not intercept
or board American ships. (55)
On both sides, UNCLOS, whatever its flaws, has been taken hostage by
ideological, political, and geostrategic considerations. On the US side,
whether or not the country is an integral part of the Convention, the ob-
jective is quite clearly to oppose the naval ambitions of China. (56) The three
aforementioned FONOPs may have been motivated more by the changing
geostrategic environment in the South China Sea, marked by a strengthen-
ing of the Chinese presence, than by the single objective of fighting against
“excessive” maritime claims. Faced with Chinese initiatives, an American re-
sponse was actually expected and desired in the US Senate as well as by
some US allies such as Japan and the Philippines. (57) As such, in light of the
concern, debate, and discontent that the deployment of missile launchers
on Woody Island created within the American political scene, (58) the an-
nouncement almost immediately afterwards by some US officials that new
FONOPs would be conducted in the South China Sea – an intention con-
firmed by the operation in May 2016 – is therefore not surprising and con-
firms the interaction between the international law of the sea and the
defence of strategic interests. (59)
Finally, the historical background clearly shows that current disagreements
date back to the time of the negotiations and the writing of the law of the
sea, in the course of which China, a developing country and a coastal state,
was concerned about its security and committed to increasing its sovereign
rights over maritime areas, while at the same time fighting “US maritime
hegemony.” On China’s side, is this inherited pattern likely to evolve at a
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time when the Chinese authorities are seeking to turn the country into a
global maritime power? Will the ongoing construction of a deep-sea fleet
and its ultimate goal to sail beyond the China Seas push Chinese leaders
to espouse American positions regarding, for example, total freedom of
navigation, as some recent events suggest? (60) This is a vast field that de-
serves wider analysis. We can also note that there is ongoing debate in
China about the law of the sea and that in this context some lawyers, such
as Mincai Yu, advocate the abolition, in the laws of 1983 and 1992, of the
distinction between warships and civilian vessels and the authorisation of
the right of innocent passage to all ships. According to Mincai Yu, the only
option for China to meet the challenges posed by the United States would
be to transform its traditional position as a coastal state into that of a
maritime power and consider the revision of national laws with provisions
inconsistent with the UNCLOS. (61) At a time when the Chinese authorities
are putting in place maritime courts with the stated goal of “protecting
the sovereignty and maritime rights in their countries,” (62) will there be
room for such debate? In any case, the impact of such a creation on the
perception and implementation of the law of the sea by China are poten-
tially important and undoubtedly deserve to be analysed in the near future. 
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